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Abstract
This paper proposes an original mechanism to elicit latent social net-
works. Subjects are invited to reveal their friends’ name and surname,
together with a score measuring the strength of relationship. According
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to the mechanism, subjects are rewarded of a fixed price either a) when
they do not name anybody or b) when the scores of a randomly selected
(bidirectional) link are suﬃciently close. We test the mechanism’s perfor-
mance in the field. Our main results are: i) a very large percentage of
links (75%) were corresponded. ii) the mechanism largely captures strong
friendship relations and practically ignores weak relations. A simple model
of friend—regarding preferences is developed to explain this evidence.
Keywords: friendship, networks, experiments, other—regarding pref-
erences.
JEL Class.: C93, D85, Z13
1 Introduction
There is a growing literature1 which highlights the importance of the structure
of social networks in our social and economic life. These works explore (both
theoretically and empirically) how the existence of social networks influence in-
dividuals’ behavior in a wide variety of contexts, from job search to information
transmission within a firm2. In this respect, being capable to properly map the
structure of a network becomes crucial to understand how the network struc-
ture influences individuals’ behavior and, vice versa, which is the impact of
1Take, for example Montgomery [20], Granovetter [14] or Calvó-Armengol and Jackson [5]
which deal with job search through social contacts; Bloch [2], Goyal and Moraga [13] develop
models related to industrial organization, specifically collusive alliances among corporations;
Kranton and Minehart [18], and Wang and Watts [26] which analyze trade in non-centralized
markets.
2Another diﬀerent context can be found in Reuben & van Winden [22] where they evaluated
reciprocity and emotions with an incomplete and inexact social network. They concluded that
the complete social network is needed to better analyze this kind of problems.
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individuals’ decision on the social network’s performance.
One of the reasons why, so far, the interest of the literature on these matters
has been mainly theoretical, comes from the diﬃculty of measuring the structure
and strength of social relationships in real-life contexts. By the same token,
also the experimental literature works on environments in which the network is
exogenously induced using monetary incentives.3
To the best of our knowledge, the seminal paper which proposes (and tests
experimentally) a mechanism for network elicitation, is that of Mobius, Rosen-
blat & Quoc-Anh [19] (MRQ, hereafter)4. In their paper they develop the
network elicitation mechanism5 as follows: i) the experiment was conducted via
internet, ii) the mechanism was a coordination game where subjects received
50 cents only if they named each other with 50 percent probability and zero
otherwise, iii) subjects were asked how much time they spend on average per
week together as a measure of link strength (if subjects agreed on this dimension
of their friendship, with an error of half an hour, the probability of obtaining
the money increased from 50% to 75%). Results obtained by MRQ mechanism
were the following: i) 37% of links were symmetric links where both subjects
had named each other ii) of those, 80% coincided in the time they spend to-
3Examples of the experimental research include coordination networks (see Keser et al.
[16], Berninghaus et al. [1], Corbae and Duﬀy [9], among others); cooperation networks
(see Kirchkamp and Nagel [17], Cassar [6] or Riedl and Ule [24]); buyer-seller networks (see
Charness et al. [7]) network formation (see Deck and Johnson [10], Callander and Plott [4],
and Falk and Kosfeld [11] and Vanin [25]).
4There are some papers which also deal with social networks but their main goal is not the
elicitation of the network but to use a network for a particular experiment. Reuben [23] and
Brañas-Garza et al. [3] are some examples.
5The aim of their paper was to measure social capital in a real-world social networks, so
they conduct a Dictator Game controlling for the variable “friendship”.
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gether (± half an hour), and iii) the average number of friends elicited was 10
(most participants spent less than half an hour with their 10th friend).
MRQ mechanism motivates this paper. We consider that there are three
potential problems in MRQ device i) as the experiment is conducted via inter-
net, there exists the possibility of subjects speaking with each other about the
game before answering ii) this game really gives subjects strong incentives to
name a lot of people, given that it does not establish any kind of punishment if
individuals do not coordinate in naming each other, iii) participants must have
friends in order to earn money, moreover the earnings in expected terms are
decreasing in the number of friends.
We develop a new mechanism which diﬀers with MRQ mainly in the follow-
ing dimensions: i) we set up a mechanism in which we reward the decision of
abstaining to elicit any link, the reason is that people may not be willing to
reveal private information —such as friends— since they might be aware of any
negative consequence in the use of this information. So, although the analysis
of the game would be much more diﬃcult, for ethical reasons we consider that
individuals should have an “exit” option (obtaining the maximum payoﬀ).
ii) In our mechanism, strength is measured on a not observable scale (as op-
posed to some observable measure, such as time spent together), we directly
ask subjects about the level of the relationship, so we obtain the measure of
this strength directly from subjects and we do not use a proxy for this variable
and iii) Incentives are not only monetary, we use as well class grades, the main
reason for this is that we consider that class grade is also a relevant payoﬀ in
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the specific context we are analyzing: the classroom network.
Why a mechanism? Without incentives, some problems could arise. One of
them would be that some subjects could be against revealing information about
themselves to some unknown experimenters. Other potential problem would be
that individuals are not going to take the task very seriously, so elicited links
wouldn’t reflect the real social network. Section 3 shows the results from a
treatment without any kind of incentives, which highly support the necessity of
a mechanism, given that only 5% of sent links were corresponded. Moreover,
13% of subjects didn’t give us the permission to use their data.
To test the robustness of the mechanism to changes in rewards, we have
conducted a session with monetary incentives. The results obtained are very
similar to the extra-credit point treatment and are explained in detail in Section
3.
Our main experimental results are: i) the number of corresponded links is ex-
tremely high (75% were corresponded, from which 80% are “exactly”, according
to our definition), ii) very few subjects choose not to name any friend, iii) all
subjects have at least one link corresponded “exactly”, iv) the average number
of friends elicited is 4.5.
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the
experimental design and procedures, while Section 3 reports the experimental
results for the three treatments. Section 4 is devoted to develop a model which
explains empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Experimental design & procedures
2.1 Rewards
We conducted three treatments with diﬀerent rewards, extra-credit points (TP),
monetary (TM) and no incentives (TNI). All sessions were run as classroom
experiments. We used classroom frame instead of voluntary participation be-
cause (i) to elicit a network first you need a real network, obviously the class
is the closest network we have access and (ii) also, we supposed that (apart
from monetary rewards) extra—credit points was one of the relevant payoﬀ in
this real situation: the class network. In the TP session, experimental subjects
could receive either one extra-credit point or nothing (the grade system in Spain
ranges from 0 to 10).
We have also used monetary rewards (5 Euros), to test the robustness of our
mechanism to changes in the incentives. Instructions were identical in TP and
TM except for the reward. In section 3 we show that main results remain in
TM treatment.
The last treatment was conducted without any kind of incentives. There
were neither game instructions nor rewards, so subjects simply were asked to
reveal some information of their friends as in a mere questionnaire. In the
Network Elicitation Mechanism subsection, we explain in detail which kind of
information was requested from participants.
To clarify ideas, instructions in the appendix show the diﬀerence between
the three treatments TP, TM and TNI.
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2.2 Subjects
The experiments with the extra-credit point were conducted, in order to ensure
the maximum attendance 6, in June 2004 during the exam of Microeconomics II,
a first year course, at the University of Jaen. We included a “special question”
as an additional item of the final exam. Students have very little exposure to
game theory. We ran the experiment in three classes: Group 1 was made of
students from the Degree in Business Studies (Group 1: morning and Group 2:
evening groups) and Group 3 Degree in Law and Business (unique group) at
the University of Jaen (Spain). These three groups consisted of 51, 53 and 31
students respectively.
The unique monetary incentives (TM) session was conducted in February
2006 at the University of Granada. The group was compounded of 39 students
from Microeconomics I, a first year course in Economics Degree (they had no
training in game theory)7.
The TNI treatment was conducted also at the University of Granada in
February 2006. The sample was 40 students from Microeconomics I, a first year
course in Business Degree8.
6To analyze the correspondence between links it was necessary to ensure the maximum
attendance. If one individual who had been named did not play the game, it was impossible
to verify if the link sent to this subject was corresponded. This situation would be problematic
in order to study of the performance of our mechanism.
7As this treatment was not conducted during an exam, the maximum attendance was not
guarantied. So, we have had to remove from our sample some links whose correspondence
could not be verified.
8This group neither had training in game theory. As in TM session, in this treatment we
had to remove some links which could not be checked.
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2.3 Network Elicitation Mechanism (NEM)
The basic structure of the Network Elicitation Mechanism (NEM hereafter) is
as follows. We asked the students to reveal the name and surname of their
friends within the population and, in a scale from 1 to 4, the strength of each
relationship.
Let sij define the “score” given by i to the ij relationship. This score ranges
from 1 to 4 as follows9:
sij = 1: j is an acquaintance of i
sij = 2: j is a close acquaintance of i.
sij = 3: j is a friend of i.
sij = 4: j is a close friend of i.
Notice that we use the term acquaintances to define “weak” social rela-
tionships (score = 1, 2), whereas we use the term friends to define “strong”
social relationships (score = 3, 4). Finally, if individual i does not name indi-
vidual j, we set sij = 0. Remark that ij or (i, j) represents a directed link from
i to j10.
NEM incentives for the TP treatment are described as follows. Subjects
would receive a fixed prize (an extra point (out of 10) in their final exam)11
9Note that we have used a strength which ranges from 1 to 4 instead of only score 1
or 2 for acquaintances or friends respectively. The reason is that we wanted to increase
the possibilities of players when they valued the relationship. The idea was to relax the
classification of friendship. Increasing the space of strategies we reduced the transcendence of
the decision and it would facilitate players’ decisions about some partners.
10A directed graph G is an ordered pair G := (V,A) with V , a set of vertices or nodes, and
A, a set of ordered pairs of vertices, called directed edges or links (i, j). In other words, a
graph or network in which relations among points or vertices are either unequal and reciprocal
or non-reciprocal.
11For TM treatment, the fixed priced for the experiment was 5C=.
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under these two CASES:
• CASE 1: if they did not name anybody, or
• CASE 2: if they named at least one subject, if all of the following three
rules apply.
rule 1 One out of the elicited links was chosen at random (each link selected
with equal probability). Let j denoting the subject named in the randomly
selected link;
rule 2 Subject i would receive the price only if also j has named her (i.e. only
if sij 6= 0). That is, if Bill named Jimmy Carter and, Jimmy named Bill
Clinton (both names and surnames).
rule 3 For obtaining the payoﬀ, the friendship score should be also accurate,
that is, if Dij = |sij − sji|  1, sij 6= 0, i.e. the diﬀerence in the scores
given by i and j is not higher than 1.12
There is another feature of our mechanism which is worth to mention at
this stage. According to CASE 1 subjects would secure the prize for themselves
not naming anybody. As we have already mentioned, we state this rule to
provide an “exit” option for subjects with no friends or reluctant to reveal
private information. We were aware that this rule could be a potential problem
to elicit the whole network. However, to ease this setback, we exploit the fact
12Note that rule 1 relaxes the mechanism, another possibility would have been to eliminate
rule 1; so, all links for each individual would be checked. In this case individuals would
perceive a high probability of losing the prize, so they would have incentives not to name
anyone. As we consider the punishment would be extreme, we introduce rule 1.
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that subject i may damage all subjects j who have named i if she doesn’t
name anybody. So we decided to highlight this possibility in the experimental
instructions by explicitly warning subjects that their friends could be damaged
by this decision, since “those subject who named them could lose the prize” (see
instructions in the appendix).
2.4 Game-form and equilibria
Given CASES 1 and 2 the game-form of our mechanism is defined by G =
{N,Si,πi}, where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the finite set of subjects, Si = {sij ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}}j 6=i is the set of strategies of subject i and πi (·) is the outcome
function of subject i. The strategy vector of subject i over all relationships with
all individuals in N is denoted as si = (si1, si2, ..., sii−1, sii+1...sin) ∈ Si ⊂ <n−1
and a strategy for each individual in N is denoted as a matrix containing all
strategy vectors, s = (s1; s2; ...; sn) ∈
Y
Si
i∈N
⊂ <(n−1)n. To define the outcome
function πi(s), let Ji = {j ∈ N \ {i} | sij > 0} be the set of subjects named
by individual i, and ji = |Ji| its cardinality. Let also jˆ be the index indicating
the subject randomly selected by the mechanism in case ji >0, i.e. a random
variable which can take any value within the range {1, 2, ..., ji} with probability
1
ji
(rule 1) only if ji > 0. Then
πi(s) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Dijˆ  1 and ji > 0
ji = 0
0, otherwise
To analyze the equilibria of this game we need to reduce its dimension, that
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is, we will show that this n-player game can be considered as
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
n
2
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ 2-player
games. The intuition behind this result is as follows. When Player i has to
decide which strategy to play with each Player j in the group, i will play this
game as if this concrete Player j were the one randomly chosen for being checked
(rule 1) given that each link is selected with the same probability. Thus, Player i
will choose independently a strategy sij , maximizing her payoﬀs, for each of the
players in the class (∀j ∈ N). In sum, we state that n subjects playing NEM is
equivalent to every pair of subjects (i, j) playing the 2-player game represented
in next figure 1.
Figure 1: 2-player reduced nem game
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The following proposition 1 states formally the relationship between the
NEM and the Reduced NEM game equilibria.
Proposition 1 A strategy s∗ ∈
Y
Si
i∈N
is a pure Nash equilibrium of the NEM
if and only if
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
is a pure Nash equilibrium of each of the 2× 2 reduced
nem game for any pair of players (i, j) ∈ N .
P roof. See appendix 2.
After this proposition we can illustrate the NEM game in next figure 2 in
the extensive form:
Figure 2: Nem game extensive form.
At the beginning of the game, player i has to decide between two options: i)
not naming anybody (sij = 00): which means to play sij = 0,∀j ∈ N (assuring
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the extra credit point) and, ii) naming at least one individual of N (∃j|sij > 0).
If player i chooses the first option, the payoﬀ will be 1. The second option
leads player i to play with each individual j in N according to the payoﬀ table
described in figure 1. From figure 1 and figure 2, it is clear that sij = 0, ∀j ∈ N
is a weakly dominant strategy.
Note that the NEM can be considered as a coordination game in a certain
sense, with some particular features: (i) there are two diﬀerent possibilities
of coordination, “negative coordination” —subjects do not name each other—, or
“positive coordination” —subjects name each other—, (ii) “positive coordination”
is only plausible if both subjects know the name and surname of each other and
(iii) errors are permitted only in “positive coordination”.
From figure 1 we can compute the set of Standard Nash equilibria in pure
strategies for the 2-player Reduced NEM game13:
NE2 =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3),
(3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 4)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
From proposition 1 we can compute the equilibria for the n-player NEM
game by calculating the variations with repetition of those 11 equilibria (the
total number of equilibria is 11
µ
n
2
¶
). Thus, the set of Standard Nash equilibria
in pure strategies for the n-player NEM game is:
13As this is a one-shot game it isn’t very useful to compute mixed strategies equilibria.
13
NEn =
(
(s∗1; s
∗
2; ...; s
∗
n) ∈
Y
Si
i∈N
¯¯ ¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
∈ NE2, ∀i, j ∈ N, i 6= j
)
.
3 Results
After the brief overview of the NEM main properties, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the NEM device. To explore in depth NEM outcome, we analyze
results in two ways: i) aggregate results to measure our NEM ability to obtain
the latent network and ii) results per capita to complete the description of the
obtained network. Remember that the whole experiment comprises 3 diﬀer-
ent groups (“networks”) NET I, NET II, and NET III, with 51, 53 and 31
students respectively. Table 1 summarizes the verification of the experimental
device for the three networks. Note that corresponded links mean that rule
#2 is fulfilled (rule #3 can be fulfilled or not), whereas non-corresponded
referred to links which fail rule #2 and exact strength means that the re-
ferred link has been corresponded with the same score, i.e., rule #2 is satisfied
and rule #3 holds with Dij = 0 (see page 9 ).
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Table 1: NEM Verification
Net I Net II Net III Total
#links % #links % #links % #links %
Corresponded 220 76% 115 70% 114 75% 449 74%
(exact strength) (180) 82% (82) 71% (98) 86% 360 80%
Non Corresp. 69 24% 50 30% 38 25% 157 26%
Total 289 165 152 606
From Table 1 we state the following.
Result 1 (main): On average, around 75% of our networks links are corre-
sponded.
The later means that a remarkable percentage of links fulfill rule #2 (see
page 9). Note that this result is remarkable since our accuracy rate doubles the
previous experimental evidence (some 36,7% in Mobius et al. [19]). Also, our
NEM provides a measurement of the strength of the relationship. The good
performance of our NEM is also confirmed by
Result 2: On average, around 80% of the corresponded links show an exact
strength.
The above results show an overwhelming rate of correspondence between
links (in spite of the fact that the probability of coordination without informa-
tion is very low because individuals can play a lot of strategies).
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We now focus on the strength of elicited links and their relative accuracy.
Figure 3a) reports the relative frequency of each strength sij in the whole set
of links14 .
Figure 3: Strength and Accuracy of elicited links
4,30%
10,70%
42,40% 42,60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
1 2 3 4
strength
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 2 3 4
success no success non-corresp.
a) Frequency of strength. b) Percentage of corresponded links.
Thus, figure 3a) shows that the number of links associated to acquaintance
relations is very small (15% over the total). Moreover, that the frequency of
links associated to “friends” (sij = 3) and “close friends” (sij = 4) is very
similar. This evidence is summarized in the following
Result 3: Our NEM largely captures “friendship” relations (some 85%) and
practically ignores “acquaintance” relations.
Figure 3b) reports the percentage of successful links —those links which
fulfill rule #2 and rule #3 but not necessarily withDij = 0 (this is the diﬀerence
with exact strength links), (see page 9)—, the non-successful links —those
which fulfill rule #2 but fail rule #3- and non-corresponded ones. Observe
14This frequency is an average of the three sessions conducted for the TM.
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that coordination occurs much more frequently when subjects elicit friendship
relationships rather than acquaintances:
Result 4: Accuracy increases with the level of friendship.
The above results clearly show that NEM mainly captures friendship rela-
tions.
Figure 4 reports the relative frequency of links per capita of our 135 partic-
ipants.
Figure 4: Links per capita
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
# links
Result 5: The average number of links per capita is 4.49; with a range from 1
to 15 links. The median value is 4 and the mode is also 4.
Result 5 shows that subjects name some friends and nobody decide to say
that he has not any friend. Then, the following question arises: do subjects feel
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ashamed of saying they have no friends and then they always name someone?
If the answer were positive then, there would exist some players who named
partners randomly and they would not be corresponded at all15. The 135 par-
ticipants were corresponded once at least; this statement, jointly to the fact
that the probability of random coordination was close to zero, let us conjecture
that subjects did not choose any partner randomly.
Recall that eliciting zero friends allowed subjects to get the prize for sure.
As Figure 4 shows, no subject opted for this option:
Result 6: All subjects revealed at least 1 link.
The rest of this section explores first the strength of links that subjects
sent per capita in the 3 networks and afterwards we study the probability of
correspondence per capita.
Now, we will analyze the average strength per capita. Let e`k denote the
average number of links sent per capita with strength k, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} ,
that is:
e`
k =
P
R
µ
`R(k)
nR
¶
3
, where nR = card{NR} (# subjects in network R,
R ∈ {I, II, III}) and `R(k) = card{sij = k | i, j ∈ NR} (# total links sent with
strength k in network R). Then, we have that e`1 = 0.19,f`2 = 0.50, e`3 = 1.96
and e`4 = 1.88. For instance, e`2 = 0.50 means that on average in each of the
three networks, each subject sent 0.5 links with strength 2. Comparing these
measures, we state:
15The probability of “positive coordination”, given that the population is suﬃciently large
and strength must be “accurate”, is close to zero even in the case a subject knows the name
and surname of all people in his class.
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Result 7: The number of links sent to friends is four times larger that those
sent to acquaintances. Also note that e`3 > e`4 and e`2 > e`1.
However, the large percentage of subjects sending links with strength sij = 4
implies that subjects do not play strategically with friends16, i.e., subjects do not
name all friends with strength sij = 3 .
It is also interesting to analyze the average percentage of non—corresponded
links per strength and per capita, that is, to study when subjects fail naming
other player.
Let eck denote the average percentage of corresponded links per capita with
strength sij = k, that is:
eck =
X
r
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
cR(k)
nRe`
k
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
3
, where cR(k) = card{sij = k | Dij  1, i ∈ NR}.
The obtained values are: ec1 = 0.31; ec2 = 0.32; ec3 = 0.74; ec4 = 0.86.
Result 8: On average, the percentage of corresponded links is clearly larger
for friends than for acquaintances. Also note that ec4 > ec3 > ec2 > ec1.
In sum, previous results indicate that the number of friendship links (sij > 2)
is larger than acquaintances. In sum,
Remark 1 The NEG captures srong socila relations and nearly ignores weak
relations.
16To play strategically means that once a subject decides to name a friend (or acquaintance)
and given that the diﬀerence in strength must be lower than 1 (Dij = |sij − sji| ≤ 1) to obtain
the payoﬀ, the optimal strength is 3 for friends (2 for acquaintances ). See figure 1 for a detailed
analysis of the strategies and equilibria.
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3.1 Comparison with no incentive treatment (TNI)
This section highlights the importance of a mechanism to elicit in a more rig-
orous way a social network. Moreover, results obtained give evidence of some
problems which can arise if there are no incentives. One of the potential prob-
lems is that some individuals could be reluctant to reveal private information.
Another one, might be that subjects do not take the task very seriously, so
elicited links would not reflect the real social network. Table 2 compares results
between an unique session run with no incentives (TNI) and the average of the
three sessions conducted with credit point reward (TP)17.
Table 2: Comparison no incentives (tni) & credit point(tp).
n corresp exact no permission
TNI 40 4.85% 60% 13%
TP 45 74% 80% 0%
In table 2, N is the average number of subjects, corresp is the percentage of
corresponded links, exact is the percentage of links with exact strength from the
corresponded links, and no permission refers to the percentage of people who
did not sign the authorization18 to use their data of the experiment (obviously,
they did not name anybody or give their own name).
Table 2 supports the above considerations about the potential problems
17As we have seen above, results in the three sessions of TP have very similar results, so
the average is a good approximation.
18At the end of the experiment we asked subjects for signing a written authorization al-
lowing us to show the results of their responses in this paper (of course, we assured subjects’
anonymity in the process of showing the results).
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which can emerge when using no incentives. On one hand, related to the prob-
lem that individuals maybe do not want to reveal private information, 13% of
individuals did not allow us to use the information requested in the experiment.
On the other hand, the second result shows the amazing high diﬀerence in the
percentage of corresponded links, 4.85% in TNI as against 74% in TP (so, the
network obtained in TNI is not a good approximation of the real network).
In sum, when incentives are not provided the obtained network seems to be
unrealistic and less rigorous than if an appropriate mechanism is used.
3.2 Comparison with monetary rewards treatment (TM)
Now, we compare our treatment with points (TP) with those data generated
with monetary rewards (TM). TP and TM share most of the features. Table 3
shows the main results for the two treatments.
Table 3: Comparison monetary (tm) and extra-credit point (tp).
n corresp exact successful no name %3,4 (corresp) %1,2 (corresp)
TM 39 69% 52% 100% 7.7% 78%(79%) 22%(32%)
TP 45 74% 80% 98% 0% 85%(80%) 15%(38%)
where, successful is the percentage of corresponded links which fulfil rule 3,
no name is the percentage of subjects who sent no links and %3,4(corresp) is
the percentage of sent links with strength 3 or 4 (from those, the percentage of
corresponded links).
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Observe that the percentage of corresponded links in both treatments is very
similar.
Although there is a considerable diﬀerence in the percentage of exact links,
observe that results referring to successful variable are not so diﬀerent for both
treatments. Thus, the accuracy of the strength in corresponded links is not
perfect in the TM, but very high, given that the diﬀerence in strength in all
corresponded links is at most 1.
Monetary rewards have not a strong eﬀect in the choice of the (00, 00) equi-
librium since the percentage of subject with 0 links in this treatment is only
7.7%.
Finally, table 3 shows that the percentage of friend and acquaintance rela-
tionships is very similar in both treatments (78% vs 85% for friends and the
complementary for acquaintances), as well as the correspondence percentage
(79% vs 80% for friends and 32% vs 38% for acquaintances). Hence, our mech-
anism captures mainly strong relationships. In sum,
i) previous results suggest that subjects are going to name other individuals
and they are not going to assure their prize naming nobody and
ii) the NEM captures strong relations among subjects.
In section 4 we develop a model which explains subjects’ behavior.
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4 A simple model for the NEM
In this section, we develop a theoretical analysis with the aim of shedding light
on the results obtained in previous section. In particular, we are interested in
exploring the following result. Despite the fact that subjects earn the prize
for sure if they say they have no friends, nobody played its weakly dominant
strategy in TP19. Hence their preferences may depend not only on material
payoﬀs but also on other considerations.
The induced game by NEM may be formally defined as a 3-tuple Γ =©
N, {si}i∈N , ui
¡
πi (si, s−i) , µsji
¢ª
, where N is the set of participants in the
experiment, si = {sij}i6=j is the strategy (strength) of individual i respect to
the ij relationship, µsii is the probability assigned by player i to the first order
beliefs of player j about the strategy si and, ui (πi (si, s−i)) is the utility asso-
ciated to the outcome of individual i when he plays sij and the individual he
named (j) plays sji.
Let us define rij as the real strength of the relationship between subjects i
and j which is perceived by player i.
Our surprising results (with particular reference to the absence of subjects
not naming anybody in TP) suggests that subjects preferences regard not only
for their own material payoﬀs but also for their friends payoﬀ. As stated in
Geanokoplos et al. [12]:
“The traditional theory of games is not well suited to the analy-
19 In TM only 7.7% of the individuals played this weakly dominant strategy.
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sis of belief dependent psychological considerations as surprise, con-
fidence, gratitude, disappointment, embarrassment and so on”.
A behavioral model which introduces these considerations (defined in the lit-
erature as belief-dependent motivations) is the Fairness Theory of Rabin [21]. A
modified version setting applied to the NEM could be useful to analyze theoret-
ically the reasons for subjects hardly never playing a weakly dominant strategy
in traditional game theory. In particularly, it can be shown that applying this
model and the “guilt aversion” concept defined by Charness and Dufwenberg
[8], the only eﬃcient equilibria coincide with the ones more frequently elicited
by the NEM, whenever the weight of belief-dependent motivations in subjects’
utility function is suﬃciently large. Although no naming any friend is still an
equilibrium, under certain conditions is not eﬃcient.
Let us define the utility function of individuals as follows:
ui (s¯ij , s¯ji, µ
si
i ) = πi (s¯ij , s¯ji) + θ
rij
i Ψi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µ
si
i )
, where πi (s¯ij , s¯ji) are the material payoﬀs corresponded to the payoﬀ table
described in figure 1, and Ψi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µsii ) represents the psychological payoﬀs
which are weighted with a parameter θriji which depends on the real relationship
between i and j perceived by i; in fact, it may be assumed to be increasing in
rij . Ψi can be decomposed into two terms:
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Ψi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µsii ) = ki (s¯ij , s¯ji)− gi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µ
si
i )
, where ki (s¯ij , s¯ji) represents a modified “kindness” function of the one de-
veloped by Rabin (1993), and gi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µ
si
i ) represents the guilt aversion
20 of
subject i. Those functions are defined as follows:
ki (s¯ij , s¯ji) = [1 + (πi (s˜ij , s¯ji)− πi (s¯ij , s¯ji))] [πj (s¯ij , s¯ji)− πj (s˜ij , s¯ji)]
s˜ij ∈
argmin
sij
πj (sij , s¯ji)
s.a. πi (s¯ij , s¯ji)  πi (sij , s¯ji)
gi (s¯ij , s¯ji, µ
si
i ) =
X
si∈Sˇij
(µsii [πj (sij , s¯ji)− πj (s¯ij , s¯ji)])
Sij =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
sij
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯ sij ∈ argmaxsi πj (sij , s¯ji)
s.a. πi (s¯ij , s¯ji)  πi (sij , s¯ji)
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
The kindness function of subject i is composed by two terms. The second
term compares: i) j’s payoﬀs with i’s current strategy (πj (s¯ij , s¯ji)) to ii) j’s
payoﬀs when i tries to minimize them (πj (s˜ij , s¯ji)), whenever i maintains or
increases his current payoﬀs.
20Recall that this term is taken from Charness and Dufwenberg [8] and we adapt it to our
framework. Charness et al. concept is based on the idea that “a decision-maker suﬀers from
guilt to the extent he believes he hurts others relative to what others believe he will do, and
he tends to avoid such choices”.
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The first term takes into account how much payoﬀ is sacrificing player i.
This term will be 1 when subject i does not sacrifice her own payoﬀs in order to
not decrease j’s payoﬀs. This term is strictly higher than 1 only in case subject
i must sacrifice his current payoﬀ for not reducing j’s payoﬀs.
To sum up, an individual i will feel that she is being “kind” to subject j
if she is not reducing j’s payoﬀs maintaining her own payoﬀs. Player i’s sense
of kindness will be higher when she is also sacrificing her own payoﬀs trying to
avoid reducing j’s payoﬀs21 .
The guilt aversion function tries to capture a situation where a subject feels
guilty because he decreases another subject’s payoﬀs. Here, we consider the
guilt in a strong way given that to compute it, subject i compares what subject
j obtains with i ’s current strategy, s¯i and what it would be the maximum
payoﬀ of j if i would favor j utmost. That is, the guilt is given by the diﬀerence
between the payoﬀs player j could obtain if player i tried to maximize them and
the payoﬀs player j obtain with the current player i’s strategy. This diﬀerence
is pondered by player i second order beliefs, i.e, the probability that i thinks
that player j assigns to player i playing a strategy which maximizes j’s payoﬀs.
These functions should be normalized but in our setting this is not necessary
given that payoﬀs are always 0 or 1.
In order to simplify the analysis we formulate the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: There is Common Knowledge between any subjects i and j,
21This function can be defined diﬀerent depending on the reference point, but in our setting
as material payoﬀs are or 1 or 0, most of them are analogous. This is also true for the guilty
aversion function.
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on the game in which they are enrolled, a reduced form of the game is
represented in figure 1 (page 11).
Assumption 2: Each subject has only psychological considerations over other
individuals payoﬀs on the part of material payoﬀs which directly depends
on himself.
This implies that at the moment of computing the psychological payoﬀs of
individual i when naming subject j, he considers that the random selected link
is the link ij. That is, player i is not going to introduce in his psychological
payoﬀs (respect to individual j) considerations about the strategies that other
players are playing with individual j.
In figure 5 we compute payoﬀs according to utility function [4] of any two
subjects i and j in N .
The Nash equilibria in pure strategies in the 2-player reduced NEM game
remain:
NE
0
2 = {(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 2), (3, 3), (3, 4), (4, 3), (4, 4)} .
However, the main diﬀerence within this model is that if the condition 1 <
1+ θrkhk holds ∀k 6= h, then (0, 0) is not an eﬃcient equilibrium. And therefore,
the equilibrium in which every subject doesn’t name anybody is not an eﬃcient
equilibrium in the n-player NEM game. This could be a possible explanation
why no subject play this equilibrium in TP treatment and very few people in
the TM treatment.
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5 Conclusions
Recent literature highlights the importance of obtaining the architecture of so-
cial interactions underlying subjects. This paper provides an innovative mech-
anism to elicit social networks.
In this mechanism friends and acquaintances are costly in the sense that
subjects have the probability of losing the payoﬀ when they name a friend or
acquaintance under some preferences.
We have conducted three diﬀerent treatments which diﬀer in the type of
incentive. The first two were based on credit points and monetary awards.
They display very similar results, which indicates that the NEM is robust to
changes in awards. The last one was the baseline and was run with no incentives
at all. Its results decidedly support the necessity of a mechanism to elicit social
networks, given the pretty reduced percentage of correspondence of 5%.
The main diﬀerence between our mechanism and the previous ones (MRQ)
is that the NEM provides very low incentives to name a lot of people given that
if subjects do not name anybody, they assure the maximum payoﬀ (note that we
introduced this rule in the mechanism in order to provide an “exit” option for
those subjects with no friends or reluctant to reveal their private information).
In each decision subjects take respect to a friend or an acquaintance, they
are aware about the risk of loosing a sure payoﬀ. Therefore, all relationships
captured by this mechanism are true friends (recall that the probability of a
random coordination is close to zero and the percentage of corresponded links
is 70% and 75% for TM and TP respectively) but it might be friends that
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are not elicited by our device. Even if this is the case, we are achieving our
goal: assuring true friendship relations by penalizing mistakes in coordination
when naming friends. In future research, we want to study other experimental
problems where the friendship relations are relevant , so we can extract a sample
of true friends from our network and control the “friend” variable, for a more
accurate analysis of the problem.
The most surprising result is that there is no subject (in the treatment where
rewards were credit points) or very few subjects (7.7% in monetary rewards
treatment) who reveal no link despite of this being a weakly dominant strategy.
It is important to note that this result is not due to the fact that individuals feel
ashamed to say they have no friends. The reason is that all subjects are corre-
sponded “exactly” (with no diﬀerence in strength) by at least one subject and
we have already explained that the probability that this coordination happens
at random is negligible.
The latter results suggest that subjects preferences regard not only for their
own material payoﬀs but also for their friends payoﬀ. Thus, in an attempt to
explain those results, we develop a behavioral model which introduces other
considerations denominated belief-dependent motivations in the literature. We
combine the concept of “kindness” from the Fairness Theory of Rabin [21] and
the notion of “guilt aversion” from Charness et al. [8]. This setting is adapted
to our NEM to analyze theoretically the reasons for subjects never playing a
weakly dominant strategy in traditional game theory. In particularly, it can be
shown that the only eﬃcient equilibria coincides with the ones more frequently
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elicited by the NEM, whenever the weight of belief-dependent motivations in
subjects’ utility function is suﬃciently large. Although, no revealing any link is
still an equilibrium, under this setting it is not eﬃcient.
Finally, remark that the main result of our mechanism is that a significant
percentage of 70%− 75% of the links were corresponded (names and surnames)
and, from those nearly 100% display a quite accurate strength (diﬀerence in
strength 1 or lower). The correspondence obtained by NEM doubles previous
experimental evidence (MQR). These results let us think that our network cap-
tures most of the relationships among individuals.
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6 Appendix 1
INSTRUCTIONS22
Hello, now you’re going to take part in an Economic Experiment. We thank
you in advance for your collaboration. This is part of a project coordinated by
a teacher from the University of Alicante and he asks you for your collaboration
to carry it out. The aim of this Experiment is studying how individuals take
their decisions in certain environments. The instructions are simple.
If you follow them carefully, you will receive an additional POINT IN THE
FINAL MARK OF MICROECONOMICS II [AMOUNT OF MONEY] confi-
dentially at the end of the experiment.
You can ask the queries you may have at any time, raising your hand but
without speaking. Except for these questions, any kind of communication be-
tween you is forbidden and subject to your expulsion from the Experiment.
Please, write a list with the name and surname of all you friends from the
class. After their names, you have to write a number:
1 if you hardly know him/her; 2 He/she is only someone you know; 3 if
he/she is your friend; 4 if he/she is a very close friend.
¿How do I GET THE POINT [RECEIVE THE MONEY]? We take your list
and take out randomly the name of one (only one) of your friends (the ones you
have mentioned); then, we look at your friend’s list and see whether:
i) he/she has mentioned you and
ii) he/she has scored you with a similar number to the one you have rated
22 In CAPITAL are highlighted diﬀerences between TP and TM (TM in brackets).
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him/her (this means a maximum diﬀerence of one point).
If i) and ii) are aﬃrmative you win THE POINT [5C=]. If i) or ii) fails, then
you win nothing (0 POINT [0C=]).
Example. My List is:
Jose Pérez with a 3.
Juan Martínez with a 4.
Emilio López with a 1.
Jose Antonio Rodríguez with a 2.
Randomly, José Pérez was chosen from my list. They then looked at his list
and he had rated me with a 4. As the diﬀerence in the scoring was just one
point, I win THE POINT FOR MICROECONOMICS II [5C=]. If I had rated
him with 2 points, I would have won nothing.
NOTICE 1. If you mention no-one, you also receive THE POINT FOR
MICROECONOMICS II [5C=].
NOTICE 2. (about the notice above). Be aware that if you mention no-
one but someone mentions you, you will be prejudicing him or her. In other
words, a friend who mentions you would not receive THE POINT FOR MI-
CROECONOMICS II [5C=] because you don’t include him/her in your friends’
list23.
23For the TNI treatment, instructions were as follows:
Hello, now you’re going to take part in an Economic Experiment. We thank you in advance
for your collaboration. This is part of a project coordinated by a teacher from the University
of Alicante and he asks you for your collaboration to carry it out. The aim of this Experiment
is studying how individuals take their decisions in certain environments. The instructions are
simple.
You can ask the queries you may have at any time, raising your hand but without speaking.
Except for these questions, any kind of communication between you is forbidden and subject
to your expulsion from the Experiment.
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7 Appendix 2
Proposition 1 A strategy s∗ = (s∗1; s∗2; ...; s∗n) ∈
Y
Si
i∈N
is a pure Nash equilib-
rium of the NEM game if and only if
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
is a pure Nash equilibrium
of each of the 2-player Reduced NEM games for any pairs of players (i, j)
in N .
Proof of Proposition 1:.
For the if part, first suppose that s∗ = (s∗1; s
∗
2; ...; s
∗
n) is a pure Nash equilib-
rium for the NEM game. Then, it satisfies:
i) s∗ = (s∗1; s
∗
2; ...; s
∗
n) ∈
Y
Si
i∈N
ii) πi
¡
s∗i ; s
∗
−i
¢
≥ πi
¡
si; s
∗
−i
¢
, ∀si ∈ Si, and ∀i ∈ N.
For the structure of the game (only one link, sij > 0↔ j ∈ Ji, is randomly
checked for each subject in N), payoﬀs can be considered in expected terms. So
condition ii) becomes:
ii)0 πei
¡
s∗i ; s
∗
−i
¢
≥ πei
¡
si; s
∗
−i
¢
, ∀si ∈ Si, and ∀i ∈ N.
According to the rules explained in section NEM (see page 9), ii)
0
can be
developed as follows.
Case 1 ∃j ∈ N
¯¯
s∗ij > 0
Please, write a list with the name and surname of all you friends from the class. After their
names, you have to write a number:
1 if you hardly know him/her; 2 He/she is only someone you know; 3 if he/she is your
friend; 4 if he/she is a very close friend.
Thank you very much.
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iii)
X
j∈J∗i
1
j∗i
πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
≥
X
j∈Ji
1
ji
πi
¡
sij , s
∗
ji
¢
, ∀sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , ∀j ∈ Ji and
∀i 6= j ∈ N.
Note that we have previously denoted Ji = {j ∈ N \ {i} | sij > 0}, ji = |Ji|
, J∗i = {j ∈ N \ {i} | s∗ij > 0} and j∗i = |J∗i |.
Another feature which can be deduced from the particular structure of the
NEM n-player game is that in all pure equilibria all subjects must obtain payoﬀs
equal to 1 (if not, it is because they have obtained 0 payoﬀ, so the have incentives
to deviate). Hence, it is satisfied that:
iv) πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
= 1, ∀s∗ij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , ∀s∗ji ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} ∀j ∈ Ji and ∀{i, j} ∈
N, i 6= j.
In addition, it can be considered that when s∗ij = 0, πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
= 1, given
that if a subject doesn’t name anybody she obtained 1 for sure.
Finally, it is directly from iv) and the previous consideration that the fol-
lowing conditions hold:
v) πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
≥ πi
¡
sij , s
∗
ji
¢
, ∀sij ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and ∀{i, j} ∈ N, i 6= j.
Thus, it have been proved that
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
is also an equilibrium in pure strate-
gies for any pair (i, j) of subjects in N of the 2-player game represented in figure
1 (see page 11).
Case 2 s∗ij = 0, ∀j ∈ N, j 6= i.
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In this case it is trivial that if each subject i in N doesn’t name anybody,
those strategies also constitute an equilibrium for the 2-player Reduced NEM
game.
For the only if part, suppose that
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
is an equilibrium in pure strategies
for any pair (i, j) of subjects in N of the 2-player Reduced NEM game (figure
1). Then, by definition:
i) πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
≥ πi
¡
sij , s
∗
ji
¢
, ∀sij ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and ∀{i, j} ∈ N, i 6= j.
With an analogous reasoning as in the if part, it can be deduced that:
ii) πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
= 1, ∀s∗ij ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} , ∀j ∈ Ji and ∀{i, j} ∈ N, i 6= j.
Case 1 ∃j ∈ N
¯¯
s∗ij > 0
From ii) it can be computed the payoﬀ for the NEM n-player game in equi-
librium:
iii)
X
j∈J∗i
1
j∗i
πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
= 1, ∀sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , ∀j ∈ Ji and ∀i 6= j ∈ N.
Finally, given that payoﬀs in the NEM n-player game can take only two
values: 0 or 1, it is clear that a convex combination of payoﬀs is always lower
or equal to 1, and hence the equilibrium conditions hold:
iv)
X
j∈J∗i
1
j∗i
πi
¡
s∗ij , s
∗
ji
¢
≥
X
j∈Ji
1
ji
πi
¡
sij , s
∗
ji
¢
, ∀sij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} , ∀j ∈ Ji and
∀i 6= j ∈ N.
Case 2 s∗ij = 0, ∀j ∈ N, j 6= i.
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In this case it is trivial that if each subject i in N doesn’t name anybody in
each of the 2-player Reduced NEM games, those strategies also constitute an
equilibrium for the n-player NEM game.
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